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Preface 
This paper is written as part of the research project "Reforming the Welfare State. 
Democracy, accountability and management", funded by the Norwegian Research 
Council. It was presented at "The Sixth Organization Studies Workshop", May 25.–28, 
2011, Abaye des Vaux de Cernay, France. 
Abstract 
In this paper we investigate how a major reform in the civil service changed 
accountability relationships. We seek to explain these changes using a transformative 
approach that combines structural, cultural and environmental perspectives taken from 
organization theory. The reform in question is the major reform of the welfare 
administration that Norway passed in 2005 and implemented through 2009. The reform 
merged the national pension administration and the employment agency and established 
local partnerships with the municipality-based social services. We map formal 
accountability relations to see whether they were changed by the reform and how they 
work in practice. More specifically we address the following accountability relations: 
Political, managerial, legal, professional and social accountability.  
Sammendrag 
I dette notatet undersøker vi hvordan Nav-reformen har endret ansvarsrelasjoner. For å 
forklare endringene benyttees et organisasjonsteoretisk transformativt perspektiv som 
kombinerer strukturelle, kulturelle og omgivelsesrelaterte faktorer. Vi kartlegger i 
hvilken grad formelle ansvarsrelasjoner er blitt endret som følge av reformen og 
hvordan de fungerer i praksis. Følgende ansvarsrelasjoner undersøkes mer spesifikt: 
Politisk ansvar, administrativt ansver, profesjonelt ansvar, legalt ansvar og 
samfunnsmessig ansvar. Nav-reformen har endret formelle ansvarsrelasjoner og ikke 
minst hvordan de utøves i praksis. Disse endringen kan føres tilbake til en kombinasjon 
av strukturelle, kulturelle og omgivelsesrelaterteforhold..  
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Introduction 
Comparative studies of public reforms are often concerned either with features of 
reform processes or their effects. They usually focus on patterns of influence among 
actors, on efficiency and on the quality of public services (Christensen and Lægreid 2001 
and 2007, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Rather seldom, however, do such studies address 
fundamental accountability questions. Reform may change accountability arrangements, 
either deliberately via formal changes in design or else unintentionally, resulting in a new 
accountability practice (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). Normally accountability is an 
ambiguous issue in reform initiatives, and it has been claimed that reforms produce both 
accountability overload and accountability deficits (Bovens, Schillemans and t’Hart 
2008). In most cases reforms involve some kind of trade-off between different 
accountability mechanisms and between accountability and other values such as 
flexibility and entrepreneurship (deLeon 1998). Administrative reform is thus not 
inherently inconsistent with accountability, and accountability mechanisms can be 
matched to public problems and agency structures that are embedded in the reforms.  
In addition, accountability is itself an ambiguous and contested concept irrespective 
of the effects of reforms. In this paper we will use a rather narrow concept of 
accountability. Bovens (2007:450) defines accountability as ‘…a relationship between an 
actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or 
her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgments, and the actor may face 
consequences’. The focus here is on whether actors can be held accountable ex post 
facto by accountability forums. One key question about accountability is the problem of 
many eyes or the ‘accountability to whom’ question, which focuses on the nature of the 
forum. Bovens, drawing on the work of Romzek and Dubnick (1987), distinguishes 
between political, legal, administrative/managerial, professional and social 
accountability. We will look at all these types of accountability. The traditional 
mechanism of upward political accountability to the parliament becomes problematic in 
a complex state with administrative reforms that deploy a concept of extended 
accountability, for here traditional accountability is only part of a cluster of mechanisms 
through which public bodies are held to account (Scott 2000). 
In this paper we use these definitions of accountability to investigate how a major 
reform in the civil service changed accountability relationships. We seek to explain these 
changes using a transformative approach that combines structural, cultural and 
environmental perspectives taken from organization theory (Christensen et al. 2007). 
The reform in question is the major reform of the welfare administration that Norway 
passed in 2005 and implemented through 2009. The reform merged the national 
pension administration and the employment agency and established local partnerships 
with the municipality-based social services. We will map formal accountability relations 
to see whether they were changed by the reform and how they work in practice. Our 
data are taken from a large evaluative study of the reform and are based primarily on 
public documents and interviews with the political and administrative elite. Altogether 
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26 administrative executives in the central welfare agency and the ministry as well as 
political executives were interviewed in 2010. 
First, we present our theoretical framework which consists of descriptive theory 
focusing on accountability theory and explanatory theory addressing a transformative 
approach. Second we present the national context as well as the more specific reform 
context. Third, we describe the formal changes in accountability relations of the reform. 
Fourth, we adresse the changes in accountability practice of the reform along the 
dimensions of political, administrative, legal, professional and social accountability. 
Fifth, we explain the changes in accountability relations by using a transformative 
approach. Finally, we draw some conclusions. 
The theoretical framework 
Des c r i p t i v e  t h eo r y :  A c coun t ab i l i t y  t h eo r y  
Accountability is an elusive, complex and multi-faceted concept. It is helpful to 
distinguish between the conceptual question of what is meant by accountability, the 
analytical question of what types of accountability are involved, and the evaluative 
question of how to access accountability arrangements (Bovens 2007, Bovens, Curtin 
and t’Hart 2010). In this paper we will focus on the second analytical question. 
Accountability embraces several different aspects: first, there is the problem of many 
eyes or to whom an individual or organization is accountable; second, there is the 
problem of many hands or who is accountable; third, there is the question of what one 
is accountable for; and fourth, the nature of the obligation. This paper addresses the 
first type of accountability. Public organizations are accountable to a number of 
different forums that apply different sets of criteria.  
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) analyzed the Space Shuttle Challenger accident from an 
accountability perspective, highlighting the institutional factors that may have influenced 
the disaster. They state that a narrow accountability concept involves ‘limited, direct and 
mostly formalistic responses to demands generated by specific instititutions or groups in 
the public agency’s task environment’ (Romzek and Dubnick 1987: 228), while a 
broader concept ‘involves the means by which public agencies and their works manage 
the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organizations’ (ibid.). Based 
on the broader concept they outline two important dimensions: whether the ability to 
define and control expectations is held by some specific entity inside or outside the 
agency; and the degree of control that the entity is given over defining that agency’s 
expectations. Combining the two dimensions produces four types of public 
accountability: Bureaucratic accountability denotes a high level of internal control by and 
accountability towards political–administrative leaders. Legal accountability denotes strong 
control by and accountability towards an external actor, for example a lawmaker. 
Professional accountability is internally related, is low on control and deals with professional 
standards and expertise. Political accountability represents a rather low level of external 
control of an agency by different actors or institutions in the environment and is often 
labeled responsiveness. 
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Bovens’ (2007) research builds on that of Romzek and Dubnick, but extends and 
elaborates their accountability perspective. He distinguishes between a broad and 
narrow accountability concept and locates that distinction along a normative/descriptive 
divide. Accountability in a broad sense is seen as normative because it is often defined 
as something positive, close to responsiveness. However, since there is no consensus on 
the standards of accountable behavior – civil servants engage in different and competing 
types of behavior that may be deemed more or less appropriate according to context – 
the concept is contested. (Christensen and Røvik 1999, March and Olsen 1989). As 
mentioned in the introduction, the narrower concept of accountability Bovens uses 
focuses on the obligations an actor has to give information and to explain and justify 
his/her conduct to a forum and that forum’s right to pass a judgment that has 
consequences for the actor. He says that accountability is by nature retrospective – i.e. a 
form of ex post scrutiny – but can also be preventive and anticipatory, meaning that it 
can provide input for ex ante policy-making. Accountability relationships presuppose 
both that the actor being held accountable will play an active role in providing 
information about and adjusting his/her behavior, but also that the forum holding 
someone to account will actively seek information, discuss accountability matters and 
use the instruments it has to adjust the behavior of the actor. 
Building on Romzek and Dubnick’s research (1987), Bovens (2007) elaborates on 
five types of accountability based on different types of forums an actor must report to. 
He sees political accountability as built on a chain or set of principal-agent relationships, i.e. 
the voters delegate their sovereignty to popular representatives in elected bodies, who 
further delegate authority to the cabinet and the civil service. Their accountability then 
moves in the opposite direction, from the civil service to the cabinet/ministries, from 
the cabinet/government to parliament and from parliament to voters. In addition, 
political parties and the media can function as informal forums for political 
accountability. Thus political accountability can include accountability to the minister or 
the cabinet within the executive branch as well as to the parliament (Storting) and to the 
public at large (Mulgan 2003).  
According to Bovens, legal accountability is becoming increasingly important in public 
institutions as a result of the increasing formalization of social relations and because 
there is greater trust in the courts than in parliament, whether these courts are civil 
courts or special administrative courts. Legal accountability is seen as the most 
unambiguous type of accountability, since it is based on specific formal or legal 
responsibilities. 
Administrative or managerial accountability is about making those with delegated authority 
answerable for carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed performance criteria (Day 
and Klein 1987). It is exercised by a range of scrutiny bodies that as quasi-legal forums 
carry out independent and external administrative and financial supervision and control 
of ministries or agencies. These may be auditors, inspectors, controllers, general offices, 
ombudsmen, independent supervisory offices, anti-fraud offices, auditing offices, etc. 
They may be primarily concerned with financial scrutiny or else focus more broadly on 
ensuring efficiency or effectiveness, as in performance auditing. Often they are linked to 
agencification and contract systems, but also to performance management systems, 
management-by-objectives-and-results systems and to the trend towards managerialism 
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in public administration, labeled as an ‘audit society’ by Power (1997). Contemporary 
reforms have put strong emphasis on managerial accountability, which means that 
managers on the one hand have been granted extended autonomy but on the other 
hand are made more directly accountable for their ability to produce measurable results 
and to run their organizations efficiently (Wallis and Gregory 2009). Political 
accountability should be confined to two functions: first, setting objectives; and second, 
evaluating policy based on an assessment of the results. Managers are left to get on with 
the rest of the business of government within a system of clear separation of policy 
making and policy implementation (Painter 2011). 
Professional accountability deals with the mechanism of professional peers or peer 
review. Particularly in typical professional public organizations different professions are 
constrained by professional codes of conduct – i.e. catalogues of conduct deemed 
appropriate – and scrutinized by professional organizations or disciplinary bodies. It is a 
system marked by deference to expertise where one relies on the technical knowledge of 
experts (Romzek and Dubnick 1987, Mulgan 2000). This type of accountability is 
particularly relevant for public managers who work in public organizations concerned 
with professional service delivery. 
Social accountability arises out of a lack of trust in government and the existence of 
several potential social stakeholders in the government or public apparatus. This 
produces pressure on public organizations whereby they feel obliged to account for 
their activities vis-à-vis the public at large, stakeholders, or (civil) interest groups and 
users’ organizations, via public reporting, public panels or information on the internet. 
Bovens (2007) not only adds social accountability as a new type of accountability; he 
also differs somewhat from Romzek and Dubnick (1987) in his categorizations of the 
other types of accountability. Concerning political accountability Bovens focuses mainly 
on the chain from the sovereign people to administrative actors, a combination of 
external and internal elements, while Romzek and Dubnick evaluate this as a more 
general responsiveness by a public agency to actors and institutions in the environment. 
Legal accountability is for Bovens more associated with the courts while for Romzek 
and Dubnick it may also relate to the legislator. Bovens sees administrative 
accountability as connected to external scrutiny bodies, while bureaucratic accountability 
for Romzek and Dubnick is internal and related to the political–administrative 
leadership. Professional accountability is defined in roughly the same way by both.  
Exp l ana t o r y  t heo r y :  A  t r an s f o rma t i v e  app r oa ch  
A transformative approach to public reforms focuses on three sets of factors – 
represented by a structural–instrumental perspective, a cultural–institutional perspective 
and an environmental perspective – that constrain and enable political and 
administrative leaders in their efforts to decide on and implement public reforms 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001 and 2007).  
The structural–instrumental perspective implies that political and administrative leaders are 
the actors who dominate decisions about and the implementation of reforms, either 
through hierarchical steering and control or through negotiation processes (March and 
Olsen 1983). They have unambiguous goals and choose a structural design for public 
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organizations that fulfills these goals, i.e. they score high on rational calculation or clear 
means-end thinking (Dahl and Lindblom 1953, Gulick 1937). In such situations, when 
goals are clear and means are known, accountability for results and bureaucratic 
accountability are possible (de Leon 1998). 
This perspective will see accountability relationships as formal, structural or 
instrumental, which means that it is primarily related to the three types of accountability 
mentioned above – political, legal and administrative/bureaucratic accountability – and 
more specifically primarily to their internal aspects where the formal aspects are more 
clearly defined. Based on this perspective the question will be whether reforms involve 
formal and structural changes that may have implications for accountability practice in 
public organizations.  
A cultural–institutional perspective takes as a point of departure the fact that, in addition 
to the formal and structural aspects of public organizations, there are important cultural 
factors that will influence reform processes and their effects. Through a gradual and 
natural process of adaptation to internal and external pressure public organizations 
become institutionalized (Selznick 1957). In the process a unique set of informal norms 
and values develops that characterize that institution. Cultural factors may enhance 
structural and instrumental aspects of reforms, but they may also potentially undermine 
them. 
If we apply these perspectives to the different types of accountability we see that 
professional accountability is typically cultural in nature, because it deals with 
professional norms and values and processes that are not formally defined. Professional 
accountability becomes most appropriate when goals are clear but means are not (de 
Leon 1998). Social accountability is also typically cultural in essence, for here actors 
account for their activities not because of a formal requirement but simply because they 
feel they have a ‘moral’ or cultural obligation to do so (March and Olsen 1989, Olsen 
1988) and because they would like to underscore their own institutional basis. The other 
types of accountability also have cultural elements. Political accountability, as defined by 
Bovens (2007), is not only about formal aspects, principal-agent relationships and 
incentives, but also about culture. It is an integrative political culture that makes 
parliaments attend to popular sovereignty and votes, even if this is a complex 
relationship. In parliamentary democracies, the cabinet is often formally based in 
parliament and accountable towards that body, but this relationship is also based on 
cultural path-dependency. It is therefore appropriate that the cabinet should have a lot 
of discretion in enacting its mandate, for example in organizing the executive apparatus. 
And the relationship between political and administrative leaders, or between 
administrative leaders and ordinary civil servants, as represented in administrative or 
bureaucratic accountability, is not only about formal aspects but also about acting in 
culturally appropriate ways (March and Olsen 1989). According to this perspective, we 
must ask whether a reform implies changing cultural norms and values and what the 
effects on accountability might be. 
An environmental perspective on reforms starts from the notion that a public 
organization has two types of environment: the technical environment and the 
institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The relationship to the technical 
environment is transactional and instrumental, and a crisis environment may increase 
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pressure for reforms, like in New Zealand (Aberbach and Christensen 2001, Boston et 
al. 1996). Both political and legal accountability have environmental components, and 
we must ask whether a reform implies pressure from and changes in the technical 
environment that may influence accountability relationships. 
The institutional environment is more related to myths and assumptions, i.e. tacit 
agreement exists at a rather abstract and symbolic level that certain reforms or certain 
ways of organizing public organizations are modern and efficient and should be imitated 
by countries and public organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977). International 
organizations or strong countries may be instrumental in spreading these myths, while at 
a domestic level ministries, agencies or consulting firms may act as reform and concept 
entrepreneurs (Sahlin-Andersson 2001). Overall, the focus on accountability could be a 
myth or fashion, as in Bovens’ (2007) interpretation of accountability as a broad 
normative category. It is taken for granted that more accountability mechanisms – 
represented by external scrutiny bodies, for example – will make public organizations 
more modern and better. With respect to political accountability, myths can be used 
along the whole chain from voters/general public, via parliament to the cabinet and the 
executive apparatus. Professional accountability may also be related to myths, like 
certain aspects of ‘evidence-based’ medicine, while social accountability is strongly 
related to how political and administrative leaders present themselves to society and the 
general public, i.e. they try to create a certain image and to influence how the 
environment defines public organizations and their leaders. Based on the institutional 
environment, we can ask whether a reform is influenced by myths and symbols and how 
this may influence accountability relationships. 
The context 
The  na t i ona l  c on t ex t  
In Norway there are two partly contradictory doctrines informing accountability 
relations. First, we have the principle of ministerial accountability which implies that the 
minister is responsible to parliament for all activities in his own ministry and in 
subordinate agencies and units (Christensen 2003). This principle enhances strong line 
ministries and weak overarching ministries. Specialization by sector is strong and there 
are weak horizontal coordinative instruments. Second, we also have a strong principle of 
local self government, implying that local government is responsible for local policy that 
might be loosely coupled to central government policy. This principle enhances strong 
municipalities and weak coupling between central and local government. Specialization 
by area is strong and there is weak inter-governmental coordination.  
Over the past 20 years the strong principle of performance management, or 
management-by-objective-and-results has been introduced, which is a tool for superior 
administrative bodies to control subordinate agencies and organizations mainly within 
the same ministerial area (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2006). By specifying 
objectives and performance indicators and establishing mandatory systems of 
performance reporting the central bodies try to enhance their control over subordinate 
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bodies and increase efficiency and effectiveness. In addition to these three principles 
there are also strong norms of professionalism, expert governance and evidence-based 
policy making; Rechtstaat values enhancing principles of impartiality, predictability and 
due process; and strong norms of participation in the policy making process by external 
stakeholders, interest groups and user interests (Egeberg 1997). The principle of 
corporative participation has been strong in the Norwegian political–administrative 
system since the Second World War (Olsen 1983). The connections between these 
doctrines and norms and the mechanisms of political administrative, professional, legal 
and social accountability are pretty close. 
The  r e f o rm  con t ex t  
During the 1980s and 90s clients and civil servants in the welfare administration in 
Norway became increasingly critical of the fragmentation of service delivery, which was 
seen as especially problematic for the multiservice clients who had to visit many 
different public offices to claim their benefits. These actors put pressure on the Storting 
to initiate changes in the structure of the welfare administration, but were unsuccessful 
in their efforts until 2001 when a strong enough coalition was formed to ask the 
government to come up with a unified solution for the welfare administration 
(Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). The minority coalition government was 
reluctant to accept this demand and sent a report back to the Storting saying that they 
did not support the idea of a unified service. A majority in the Storting was dissatisfied 
with this answer and replied that the government must deliver a more holistic service. 
This resulted in the government deciding to establish a public committee of experts to 
look into the matter. Their conclusion was that the basic fragmented structure was 
sound, but that the unemployment and social services should collaborate more closely at 
the local level. 
The minister for the welfare administration who came to office in 2004 now headed 
a ministry that for the first time had all the relevant welfare services in one ministry. 
Realizing that it was politically impossible to come back to the Storting with yet another 
fragmented solution, he proposed a compromise that entailed a partial merger. The 
main goals of the compromise were to get more people off benefits and into work, to 
offer a more user-friendly and coordinated service and to be more efficient.  
The administrative welfare reform was primarily a structural reform, consisting of 
two crucial elements. The first entailed a merger of the agencies for employment and the 
national pensions system, creating a new welfare agency (NAV) on all levels 
(Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). The second element entailed the 
establishment of a local partnership between this new agency and the social services at 
the local level run by the municipalities. The idea was to locate all services in one place 
and reduce the number of tasks involved to a minimum. Two aspects of this solution 
are worth mentioning. One is that it was politically impossible to propose a completely 
unified welfare administration, because that would have implied that it should be run 
either by central or by local government, which was not politically feasible. The second 
aspect is that the legally enshrined mandatory partnership required the support of the 
local authorities and their central organization, and one way to do this was to allow a 
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dual local management in the welfare offices, making it easier for both actor groups to 
be represented and also allowing the municipalities to offer more services in local 
offices, over and above the minimum required. This might be seen as the central state 
increasing its influence and interfering in local self-government, but it could also be 
interpreted as local government getting central government to finance more local 
services. 
After the Storting approved the reform in 2005, an interim period of one year 
followed during which the old organizations continued to run as usual while the new 
internal structures were being discussed and decided on. The new welfare administration 
officially began operating in 2006. It was based on a central partnership agreement 
between the government and the central organization for the municipalities followed by 
local agreements between the new NAV agency and all the municipalities. The process 
of establishing local welfare offices in all municipalities took four more years to finish.  
In 2008 the reformed system underwent two significant reorganizations. One was the 
establishment of six regional pension offices, while the other entailed the establishment 
of county-based administrative back offices. This involved shifting quite a few 
personnel resources from the local level up to the regional level. The main arguments 
for this were that regional units provided an opportunity to increase the quality of 
casework. What this meant in practice was increasing competence and introducing more 
standardization, equal treatment and efficiency with respect to different benefits, while 
at the same time giving local offices the opportunity to focus on their two main tasks: 
providing information and guidance for their clients and helping the clients to get work. 
Central political and administrative actors, both in the ministry and in the welfare 
agency, saw this reorganization of the reform as a major precondition for fulfilling the 
aims of the original welfare reform. The paradox, however, was that the reorganization 
potentially undermined the original main reform idea of strong welfare offices in each 
municipality. 
Formal change in accountability relations 
In this section we locate Norwegian types of accountability in the context of the 
theoretical discussion above. We also outline the questions asked in interviews with 
elites about changes in accountability resulting from the major NAV reform. The focus 
here is on the formal changes in accountability relations brought about by the NAV 
reform. 
Political accountability. Our definition of political accountability concurs very closely 
with Bovens’ (2007). Norway espouses the principle of individual ministerial 
accountability whereby the minister is accountable to the parliament – the Storting – for 
everything that goes on in his/her executive administrative apparatus, meaning the 
ministry and the subordinate organizational levels and units. Within a ministry the 
administrative leadership is accountable to the political leadership, as are the directors of 
the agencies and regulatory agencies. Olsen (1983) labels this the ‘parliamentary chain of 
command’.  
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In addition to this principle Norway also adheres strongly to the principle of local 
self-government. Normally these two principles are loosely coupled and some of the 
main challenges in the Norwegian political administrative system have been about how 
to link accountability upward to the parliament with accountability downward to the 
local council. This was a central issue in the NAV reform since two of the tasks – 
pensions and the labor market – were central government responsibilities while the third 
– social services – had traditionally been the responsibility of the municipalities.  
We differ from Bovens in seeing this parliamentary chain less as an ‘economic man’ 
set of relationships and more as an ‘administrative man’ set of accountability 
relationships governed by bounded rationality and based on a structural–instrumental 
perspective. The focus in our question on political accountability was whether the elite 
respondents thought the reform had brought about any changes in the relationship 
between the new welfare agency and the political leadership on the one hand, and in the 
relationship between the political leadership and the Storting on the other. 
One important formal change in accountability relations was the concentration of 
both pensions and labor market affairs in one ministry, which streamlined accountability 
relations from the previously loosely coupled and partly competing relationship between 
different ministries with responsibility for different tasks. Formally, the new NAV 
agency was established within a rather traditional ministry-agency model, implying a 
rather close relationship and considerable interaction between the ministry and agency. 
This is interesting coming after 10–15 years of devolutionary tendencies in the 
Norwegian civil service in which agencies have moved away from the political executive 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001). One major reason for sticking to a model with 
considerable potential for political control is that this is the largest central administrative 
reform ever and a very crucial political area. Normally, the Storting would be rather 
passive concerning the organization of the central public apparatus, because this is seen 
as the executive’s prerogative. The NAV reform is different in this respect, because the 
Storting initiated the reform and pressured the executive to come up with a solution, 
and it has been very active in following up on the reforms following their 
implementation. This offers potential for what in the US is labeled ‘sub-government’ 
(Gormley 1989), in this case implying a rather hands-on attitude from the Storting. 
The biggest change in formal accountability relations the reform implied was the 
introduction of the partnership arrangement between central and local government, 
which was supposed to be an organizational innovation that would resolve the 
contradictions between the principle of ministerial responsibility and the principle of 
local self government. The partnership is compulsory by law and mandatory for all 
municipalities. The law stipulates that there should be one welfare office in every 
municipality and that the welfare office should be a joint front-line service, implying co-
location of the social services administration and the new integrated employment and 
welfare administration. The welfare office can either have a joint management or a dual 
management arrangement, with one manager from the municipality and one from the 
employment and welfare administration (government). From the municipal side the 
welfare office should as a minimum include financial social assistance, financial advice 
and the provision of housing for the homeless; in addition each individual has the right 
to have a social and welfare services plan worked. These one-stop shops are based on 
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fixed, regulated, binding but also flexible co-operation agreements between the central 
and the local authorities, which are negotiated between the regional NAV office and the 
individual municipality (Fimreite and Lægreid 2009). Summing up, the partnership 
model introduced by the NAV reform is a public–public partnership comprising only 
public partners at the central and local levels. The partnership was envisaged by the 
reform agents as a ‘Columbian egg solution’ that would simultaneously establish a one-
stop shop in every municipality in which all three services were included and accept the 
present division of tasks and responsibilities between central and local government to 
fulfill common goals. 
The partnership model in NAV is a hybrid of hierarchy and network and tends not 
to clarify lines of accountability (Fimreite and Lægreid 2009). A key question in this 
model is how one can have joint action, common standards and shared systems on the 
one hand and vertical accountability for individual agency performance on the other. 
The challenge is to better balance accountability to central government, accountability to 
the local council and social accountability (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). There is a 
built-in inconsistency in the NAV reform. It claims to empower users and clients, to 
free managers, to enhance administrative accountability and to strengthen political 
control by both central and local political bodies. But in reality it is difficult to achieve 
these things simultaneously. 
Administrative accountability. Administrative accountability in Norway is primarily 
concerned with different aspects of performance management, meaning that this type of 
accountability is more focused on internal administrative processes than political 
accountability, where the crucial question internally is the relationship between the 
political and administrative leadership. Political leaders in Norway are not very involved 
in performance management, which in many ways is rather technical. Management-by-
objectives-and-results is a main steering tool in the NAV organization, both between the 
ministry and the NAV agency and internally between the central NAV organization and 
the local branches. In addition a purchaser–provider-model has been established 
between the NAV agency and a quasi-autonomous internal body providing ICT and 
other services. But performance management in Norway is also carried out via the 
Auditor General’s Office, so there is a component of external scrutiny here. In this 
respect our question to the elite respondents on administrative accountability combined 
the internal focus of Romzek and Dubnick (1987) with the external focus of Bovens 
(2007). 
Legal accountability. The court system’s rather low political and administrative status 
means that Norway deviates from the definitions given by the authors mentioned above 
of legal accountability as an externally related factor. Norway does not have a system of 
administrative courts, and few political or administrative matters reach the ordinary 
courts; instead they are handled in political–administrative decision-making processes. 
This is slowly changing, partly because of Norway’s adaptation to the EU, which puts 
more emphasis on individual rights.  
In NAV there is a unit for complaints within the central body for special units. These 
replicate comparable units in the two agencies that formerly constituted the NAV. If 
clients are not satisfied with a decision made by the complaints unit, they can appeal to a 
special court which deals mainly with pension cases, i.e. this is deviating from the 
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common pattern. In some cases they can also complain to the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, but his/her opinions and decisions are not binding for the central 
administration. Judicially the NAV is internally accountable, for there is no external 
judicial scrutiny body that covers the whole of NAV, even though the Office of the 
Auditor General exercises some of the functions entrusted to judicial watchdogs in 
other countries; moreover, as already mentioned, the pensions court also has a role to 
play.  
The crucial questions we put to our respondents on the impact of the reform on 
legal accountability was derived from a more general principle of rule of law. We asked 
three questions specifically related to legal accountability: one concerned the rule of law 
and the judicial rights of clients; the second concerned equal treatment of similar cases 
and standardization; and the third was about how to organize a complaints procedure 
within NAV. This pertains more to the internal connection between the welfare 
administration and its clients than to external judicial scrutiny. 
Professional accountability. Two types of professional competence, representing the 
professional cultures formerly related to pensions and employment, are covered in the 
new NAV agency. In addition the professional culture of the social services in the 
municipalities also comes to bear in the local welfare offices. Historically the pensions 
administration had a rather traditional rule-oriented culture characterized by a focus on 
single cases, and this profile did not change much in the run-up to the reform. The 
employment administration was traditionally a government monopoly managing a lot of 
resources and a variety of programs designed to help people find a job – a typically 
social democratic policy feature. During the final decade before the reform, the 
employment service changed considerably. It underwent a modernization and found 
itself competing with private employment providers. The social services in 
municipalities had historically been based largely on discretion and local knowledge and 
were dominated by social workers, but over time they became more professional and 
rule-based. 
Social accountability. Using Bovens’ definition of social accountability (2007) we 
asked our elite respondents about possible changes in social accountability brought 
about by the reform focusing on two aspects: their relationship with clients and societal 
relationships. 
Changes in accountability practice 
Po l i t i c a l  a c coun tab i l i t y  
The basic question concerning political accountability in the NAV reform is whether the 
relationship between the political executive and the sector ministry on the one hand and 
the new NAV agency on the other has changed in reality, even though it has not 
changed formally. The other relationship is the one between the parliament, the 
Storting, and the government and the agency. The elite interviews revealed a number of 
prevalent attitudes regarding changes in the actual political accountability relationship. 
First, respondents seemed to agree that reforms had little impact on the policy 
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development function in the sense that it continued to be based in the political 
executive. Nevertheless, a majority thought that in reality the pattern of influence had 
changed in favor of the NAV agency. This had mainly to do with the size of the NAV 
agency and the whole NAV organization (15000–20000 employees), which gave it the 
upper hand concerning expertise. Moreover, the complexity of this enormous 
organization made it difficult for the ministry to gain insight and information and to 
handle that information (see Brunsson 1989). The period 2006–2009 was also a time 
when the municipalities were very preoccupied with implementing the reform, which 
put the ministry at an even greater disadvantage. Despite the fact that the political 
leadership is now steering one instead of three separate administrations and the NAV 
reform is a salient policy area, the ministry lacked alternative information, making it 
dependent on the leadership of the agency. Frequent changes of minister also weakened 
the influence of the political executive. 
Second, even though the actual political accountability pattern has changed and 
respondents saw the NAV agency as strengthening its position, few of them thought 
this would increase conflict. The political–administrative leadership in the ministry and 
the leadership in the agency seem to be in close contact and agreement, but, as 
indicated, the top leadership of the agency seems to have strengthened its role in 
influencing important decision premises, thereby in reality tilting the unchanged 
accountability relationships.  
Third, even though the performance management system, inspired by NPM, is 
meant to make a less ambiguous distinction between the political and administrative 
roles, some respondents said there was more ambiguity than before concerning political 
and administrative jurisdiction and that the two groups of actors tended to offload 
responsibility onto each other (‘passing the buck’), especially in times of crises. Some of 
the respondents also thought the director of the NAV agency had been made a 
scapegoat and had to some extent accepted this role when external criticism had been 
strongest, implying that the position of director had become politicized, but also that 
the director had room for maneuvre. 
Fourth, according to the respondents the Storting has been more active than normal 
in two different ways. First, it has exerted strong and consistent pressure on the 
government and to some extent on the agency as well, for example by staging a high-
profile public hearing on NAV in the Storting. Second, it has used alternative 
information from the organizations, allowing users and employees influence through the 
media. This has shifted the focus more onto single cases and clients and away from the 
effects of the new system as such, which at times can be frustrating both for the political 
leadership and for the leaders of the NAV agency. In this respect there has also been a 
tendency to blame NAV for everything, even issues relating to the municipalities and 
their social services, over which NAV has limited control, as well as for a number of 
problems originating in other sectors. Overall, however, despite the Storting’s hands-on 
approach to NAV issues, the respondents seemed to agree that the Storting was also 
losing influence – as was the political executive – vis-à-vis the NAV agency. This 
happened despite an unchanged accountability relationship to the Storting. 
In theory the partnership model should be a partnership between equal partners, but 
in practice the central government tends to become the big brother and to have the 
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upper hand in the partnership arrangements. This seems especially to be the case with 
respect to the many small municipalities, while in the few very large municipalities it 
seems to be the other way round. The fact that the municipal part of the local office is 
subordinated to steering from locally elected representatives while the government part 
is subordinated to the ministerial chain of command leads to a problematic double-
steering arrangement at the local NAV office (Fimreite 2010). There are more than 70 
different local solutions regarding the task portfolio, which does not make 
accountability relations easier either (Christensen and Aars 2011). The local NAV 
offices represent a combination of standardization and local adjustments (Fimreite and 
Hagen 2009). In practice the partnership does not live up to the expectations of a real 
partnership and the partnership model reduces rather than strengthens the local room 
for maneuver (Fimreite 2010).  
This practice also has implications for accountability. Seen from a social 
accountability point of view the partnership model and the one-door approach can be 
an advantage for users. The problem, however, is that the partnership model blurs 
political accountability for services, making it difficult for citizens to discern which 
political level is accountable for what service and hence which politicians should be held 
accountable in general elections (Askim et al. 2010, Fimreite and Lægreid 2009). This is 
a common feature of network-based governance structures (Aars and Fimreite 2005) 
and the question is whether these kinds of arrangements reduce local government 
autonomy.  
The conclusion we reached from the survey responses is that the political 
accountability relationship in reality has changed. The NAV agency and its leadership 
have strengthened their position both vis-à-vis the Storting, the central political 
executives in the ministries and local government.  
Adm in i s t r a t i v e  a c coun t ab i l i t y  
Formally, there seem to have been few changes in hierarchically based administrative–
economic accountability as a result of the NAV reform, which means that it is 
characterized by a rather complex system of performance management and 
management by objectives, based in letters of intent from the ministry, internal plans 
and performance systems, and control and reporting systems, like in any agency. But the 
respondents seem to agree that the reform has changed actual administrative 
accountability in the direction of increased bureaucratization, although the features they 
identify and the reasons they give differ.  
First, the respondents seem to agree that the Office of the Auditor General has 
become much more active towards NAV than it previously was towards the agencies 
forming NAV. The Auditor General has about 40–50 people working with different 
aspects of NAV, which represents a lot of capacity. The respondents seem overall to be 
critical towards this external scrutiny, saying that it is excessive, too detailed and shifting, 
too control-oriented and insensitive to the fact that NAV is a huge and complex 
organization that has made a great effort to set up local offices and implement the 
reform. It is also worth mentioning that the Office of the Auditor General wrote a very 
critical report on NAV, which resulted in the above-mentioned public hearing in the 
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Storting. One of its main criticisms was the loose connection between the general goals 
in the state budget and the objectives and performance indicators formulated in the 
letter of allocation between the ministry and the NAV agency.  
Second, many of the respondents seem to think that internally the NAV agency has 
had a tendency to create too many staff functions related to control, without clearly 
defining their roles, hence the increasing emphasis on systems of control and risk 
steering. The multiple and changing routines are perceived as challenging, even though 
some of them are actually held to work rather well. Some respondents say that the 
apparent increase in problems of control is also related to exposing old problems. Result 
steering has had trouble getting off the ground in NAV. The tendency seems to have 
been to shift the steering focus from the overall goals of the reform to details of control. 
Overall, some of the respondents perceive rather loose coupling between the large 
central control capacity and actual control activities on the local level. These problems 
of managerial accountability are also partly due to the lack of an integrated ICT system, 
which makes it difficult to get systematic and reliable data. 
Third, uniform quality standards for the entire organization have failed to be defined. 
National routines for measuring quality are lacking, and quality varies considerably 
between counties and local NAV offices. The performance management system 
measures activities and output more than outcome (Breivik 2010).  
Fourth, the local partnership model is rather ambiguous concerning responsibility for 
the activities of local offices. Because this is a hybrid organization that represents a 
collaboration between the central government NAV agency and the social services of 
the municipalities, based in local democracy, it has not, for example, been possible to 
introduce a performance management system for the municipalities; the principle of 
local self governance implies that local governments may have goals and objectives that 
are not in line with those of central government.  
Fifth, it proved difficult to get the purchaser-provider model to work, and this 
arrangement at the central agency level was dismantled after a short period. Sixth, 
building up regional level pension and management units at the expense of the local 
NAV offices and the partnerships has strengthened administrative accountability 
relations. Transferring personnel as well as tasks from the local partnership level to the 
regional state government level also tends to strengthen administrative accountability 
relations.  
Summing up, the reform seems to have brought increased bureaucracy in control and 
scrutiny systems designed to secure administrative accountability, concerning both the 
number and type of control systems and personnel and administrative capacity. It is, 
however, difficult to get a simple management-by-objectives-and-results system to work 
as a steering tool for such a large and complicated agency as the NAV.  
Lega l  a c coun tab i l i t y  
First, several of the respondents underscored that the reform had revealed the problems 
of the rule of law and quality of the casework in the old system. This came about 
through the reform’s introduction of less ambiguous rules and less discretion and, as 
mentioned above, more control systems and activities. The downside is more 
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complicated rules and control systems. There is also some doubt about whether 
increased formalization is enough to bring about equal treatment, and some respondents 
pointed to geographical inconsistencies in the treatment of apparently similar cases. 
Second, many of the respondents thought the reorganization of the reform in 2008, 
which established county-based back-offices, had improved the rule of law and made 
the treatment of clients more equal. The argument was that with fewer units, around 25 
units on the regional level instead of 430 local offices, it had become easier to bench-
mark. Larger areas of competence also improved the situation for clients, because it 
made it easier for the providers of different types of benefits to exchange information 
and hence to provide more equal treatment. In addition it is now possible for the 
leadership to exert pressure in this direction and make employees more aware of the 
importance of equal treatment. Respondents also pointed out that common method-
related instruments were required for the discretionary handling of cases and that 
employees needed to be trained in this area, particularly with respect to local social 
services. 
Third, some of the respondents were concerned about the complaints system in 
NAV, i.e., with how easy it is to complain and how the complaints mechanism is 
organized. Some pointed to the fact that a good application process would provide 
more legitimacy when clients complained, while others emphasized that more control 
systems might be seen as negative by clients, particularly those whose applications were 
rejected. There has been some discussion about whether a regulatory agency or an 
ombudsman is needed in the welfare organization for centrally based governmental 
services, but this discussion has yet to be concluded, although there is already an 
ombudsman for locally based welfare services. The Storting has contributed to the 
politicization of this question, because it is preoccupied with the treatment of single 
cases, as revealed in the complaints process, which showed system problems. 
Summing up, judicial accountability has changed as a result of the restructuring and 
increased focus on control and the formalization of the complaints process brought 
about by the reform. Overall this is perceived as enhanching the rule of law and equal 
treatment of clients. Respondents also attributed these effects to the establishment of 
country back offices.  
P ro f e s s i ona l  a c coun t ab i l i t y  
Most of the respondents describe a rather turbulent and challenging situation for 
professional accountability in NAV after the reform. Overall they agree that there is a 
need to join-up the different professional cultures and that this process is likely to be 
beset with tensions. They disagree, however, about what are the most important aspects 
of this and whether there are reasons to be optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects 
for developing a new professional culture. 
The optimistic take is that the reform has led to more focus on professional 
knowledge and accountability and that there are bound to be professional synergy 
effects of such a merger or collaboration between professional cultures, even though the 
process has yet to be completed. A large organization may also benefit from having 
some tension between different professional groups and tasks. Tensions will also differ 
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depending on how heterogeneous some units are professionally, and there has been 
some talk internally about creating a common NAV education. 
The negative arguments are different. Some say that developing a general 
professional ideal is unrealistic in an organization handling 55–60 different tasks or sub-
services. There has also been some conflict among professional groups about the 
organizational and professional positions in the new organization. Professional groups 
from the former pensions and employment administrations have had problems focusing 
sufficiently on professional development, tending to fall back on traditional methods 
and professional approaches. Professionals in the NAV agency seem to mistrust the 
professionalism and problem-solving capacity of the local social services. This may be 
because the partnership model is ambiguous about how to develop the professional 
aspects. A strategy for competence development seems to be lacking. 
While the respondents may disagree about the effects of the reform on professional 
accountability, they also perceive some parts of the new organization as functioning well 
in this respect, while they see others as struggling or not making a sufficient effort.  
Soc i a l  a c coun t ab i l i t y  
First, concerning the relationship to clients, some respondents pointed out that the 
reform had made the situation more complicated for users because units, employees and 
tasks had been moved around. This is basically seen as a disadvantage for the clients, 
because it destabilizes the employee-client relationship, even though some users may 
benefit from changing their contacts. However, the larger units implied by the reform 
may eventually restore stability. 
Second, the merger or collaboration of three types of welfare services is seen as 
improving competence and increasing the probability that clients’ needs will be fulfilled. 
The needs of clients have become more important in the new organization, because that 
is the crucial relationship for measuring the effects of the reform. User surveys are used 
more intensively than before in NAV. Face-to-face contacts are thought to have 
improved, while telephone services are struggling. 
Third, there is agreement that multi-service users are better off after the reform, i.e. 
one of the main aims of the reform seems to have been fulfilled. But there are more 
doubts about how the users of only one service are coping in the new complex system. 
Fourth, there seems to be some disagreement about how the reform has changed the 
relationship between the NAV agency and the users’ and employees’ organizations, 
although most repondents judged this as negative. Some few respondents stressed that 
contact was closer after the reform than before, while others thought the organizations 
had lost influence, partly as a result of their contacts with the Storting and their focus on 
single cases, and the fact that the ministry and the agency tried to avoid involvement in 
single cases. There is a forum for contact with the organizations, but it is not used 
much. The dialogue with stake-holders in the labor market – the large employers’ and 
employees’ organizations – seems to have weakened, and NAV’s function as a societal 
actor in this respect is not strong. 
Summing up, respondents paint a rather mixed picture with respect to the reform’s 
effects on social accountability.  
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A transformative perspective revisited 
Using a transformative approach to explain the weakening of political accountability, we 
can start with an instrumental or structural perspective. As mentioned, the formal 
accountability relationship between the political leadership and the NAV agency has not 
changed as a result of the reforms, but actual political accountability does seem to be 
changing nonetheless. Why is that? One important factor is size and complexity 
(Egeberg 2003), which makes it rather difficult for the political leadership to follow up 
on the reform and makes it more dependent on the NAV leadership. The political 
leadership faces the paradox to which Brunsson (1989) pointed, namely that politicians 
in modern societies increasingly lack information about and influence over what is going 
on in subordinate agencies and public companies but still often get the blame when 
things go wrong. With the exception of the blame question, these are issues in this 
reform too. The government comes in for a lot of criticism from the Storting and the 
media, which makes it more dependent on the NAV leadership and hence tempted to 
blame the NAV for shortcomings. The latter factor reflects the importance of the 
technical environment. 
The cultural perspective may also help to explain why political accountability is 
changing and why the position of the political leadership has weakened. Path-
dependency has led the government to choose a rather traditional model for the 
ministry-agency relationship. This creates problems because the NAV agency and its 
subordinate organization are so huge and complex. At the same time, the Storting has 
deviated from its historically passive attitude to administrative reforms, exerting more 
pressure on the political executive and making this pressure more difficult to handle. 
Political accountability is also influenced by the institutional environment – i.e., the 
Storting and the media’s primary focus on symbol-ridden single cases and problems that 
tends to ignore the complexity of the reform and the time required to get systematic 
structural changes up and running. 
The other main element of political accountability is local self-government. As 
already pointed out, the new formal partnerships introduced by the reform have 
brought about a formal change in the relationship between central and local 
government. Seen from a structural–instrumental perspective this is a rather hybrid 
organizational solution, in which local welfare offices become subordinated to both 
central and local government – a dual hierarchy in other words. Our conclusion based 
on the interviews is that overall this new solution has changed real accountability 
relationships in favor of central government, simply because of its size, resources and 
influence over the implementation of the partnerships. There was some variation in the 
overall trend, however, with local NAV offices in larger cities becoming generally more 
influential vis-à-vis the center. In practice this means they make fewer attempts to 
coordinate and meld services. Seen from a cultural perspective, the latter feature means 
that professional cooperation between central and local services is more problematic to 
achieve, and more stands in the way of forging a common cultural identity. 
We can interpret the strengthening of administrative accountability relations through the 
instrumental–structural perspective. Here there have not been many formal changes, but 
the resources used, the diversification that has developed and the intensity of control 
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systems add up to substantial actual changes in administrative accountability. At the 
same time, many respondents doubt whether all these systems are really working and 
believe that all that has emerged is a rather symbolic meta-system. The impact of the 
institutional environment has been to increase control, since it is important for NAV to 
show the environment, and especially the Office of the Auditor General, that it cares 
about control, even though a complex organization like NAV finds it quite difficult to 
fulfill administrative–economic control aims in practice. Seen from a cultural 
perspective, one reason for some meta-control may be that the administrative culture in 
the agency has problems with a control-oriented reform implementation. 
To understand the effects of the reform on legal accountability we can use a structural–
instrumental perspective. By improving and cleaning up the old system the political–
administrative leadership has apparently enhanced its judicial accountability. Pressure 
from the technical environment, especially the Storting, is also part of this equation. But 
there are also cultural factors at work here, particularly the fact that the creation of 
county back-offices has raised awareness and competence in this area. The institutional 
environment seems to have some relevance in the discussion about whether to establish 
a regulatory agency or an ombudsman for central governmental welfare services. 
The picture regarding professional accountability is rather mixed, and this can best be 
understood from a cultural perspective. Employees simultaneously cling on to the 
traditional professional culture and methods and try to adapt and develop something 
new. The instrumental–structural perspective shows us how a structural merger of two 
agencies together with the local partnerships gives rise to pressure to create a new 
culture. However, there is considerable variation between units and employees, with 
some continuing to work roughly as before while others are engaged in something new 
or are experiencing a complex combination of professional cultures. In the former case 
path-dependency may dominate, with little movement towards devoloping a new, 
joined-up professional culture, while the latter case obviously facilitates such a 
development. While it may be necessary to create a common education for NAV, this 
has been a thorny political issue. 
The instrumental–structural take on social accountability is that the structural changes 
introduced by the reform have created greater structural complexity. While this is 
certainly problematic for some users, the increased focus on multi-service users seems 
to have been a success, having been given strong priority by the ministry, the NAV 
agency and the Storting. This is also symbolically important for all these actors and 
implies a cultural change internally. NAV’s social role vis-à-vis other organizations 
seems to have weakened. This is due partly to the NAV’s rather inward-looking focus in 
implementing the reforms, but also to the uncooperative attitude of external 
organizations. These have exerted environmental pressure, both of a technical and 
institutional character, expressed mainly by their use of the media and the Storting to 
portray a crisis in NAV, and they have also tended to focus on single cases, which does 
not further collaboration. 
Summing up, understanding changing accountability relations seems to involve a 
complex and dynamic logic. The different explanatory factors seem to work together 
and influence one another (Christensen et al. 2007). Changing accountability cannot be 
understood solely as a product of instrumental processes and strategies by 
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administrative and political executives; but neither is it solely the outcome of a historical 
legacy, path dependencies and informal norms, nor solely the result of adaptation to 
environmentally determined myths. Instead, changing accountability relations must be 
construed as a complex interplay between deliberate strategies, cultural features and 
external pressure. 
As shown by Table 1, the overall picture is that the reform has done rather little to 
change the various types of accountability in formal terms, but that it has had an impact 
on accountability relationships in practice.  
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Table 1. Accountability changes as a result of the welfare administration reform in Norway. 
 Formal 
changes in 
accountability 
Actual changes 
in accountability 
Respondents’ 
experiences 
Explanations 
Political 
accountability 
– the principle 
of ministerial 
responsibility 
No Yes, NAV-agency 
more influence 
NAV agency 
large and 
complex. 
Ministry lacks 
information 
and insight.  
More grey 
zones in 
political–
administrative 
dimension. 
Storting more 
active. 
Instrumental: 
Size and 
complexity of 
agency.  
Culture: 
traditional model 
for ministry-
agency 
relationship 
retained.  
Environment: 
More external 
pressure and 
symbols related 
to single cases 
and crises. 
Political 
accountability 
– the principle 
of local self-
government 
Yes, 
mandatory 
partnership 
agreements 
The central 
government has 
a strong position 
in the 
relationship 
Difficult to 
fulfil the idea 
of equal 
partners. 
Squeezing 
local self- 
government 
Instrumental: 
size and 
resources of 
central 
government 
matter, but so 
does size of 
municipalities. 
Culture: Cultural 
diversity retained 
in large cities, 
making local 
offices more 
locally based. 
Administrative 
accountability 
Overall no, 
but more 
scrutiny from 
the Office of 
the Auditor 
General 
More resources 
for and more 
bureaucratization 
of control 
systems  
Increasingly 
complex 
control 
systems 
Problems of 
goal-focus, 
quality and 
responsibility 
Instrumental: 
Bureaucratization 
of control 
systems. 
Culture: 
Problems of 
developing 
control culture 
Environment: 
More real 
external control, 
but also meta-
features of 
control 
Legal 
accountability 
No Yes, more rule of 
law and equal 
treatment 
Divided 
opinions 
Instrumental: 
Effects of 
merger, 
collaboration and 
reorganization of 
the reform 
Culture: new 
culture in back 
offices  
Environment: 
Pressure from 
the Storting 
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 Formal 
changes in 
accountability 
Actual changes 
in accountability 
Respondents’ 
experiences 
Explanations 
Professional 
accountability 
Yes Yes, challenges 
of merging or 
collaboration 
between 
professional 
cultures 
Divided 
opinions 
Structural: 
Indirect effect of 
structural 
changes  
Culture: 
Different path-
dependent 
professional 
cultures 
Social 
accountability 
Yes, for 
clients  
No, for 
societal 
relationships 
Yes, better for 
some clients 
Yes, societal 
connections 
weakened 
Better for 
multi-service 
clients, more 
ambiguous 
effects for 
one-service 
clients. More 
focus on 
client needs. 
Poorer 
relationship 
between 
societal 
organizations 
and 
government 
Structural: 
Structural 
changes and 
more political 
focus on multi-
service clients. 
Culture: Cultural 
changes in 
attitudes towards 
clients 
Environment: 
Increasing 
pressure from 
societal actors. 
The elite respondents seem to agree about many of the changes in political, 
administrative and social accountability, but they are more divided with respect to 
judicial and professional accountability. The structural–instrumental perspective seems 
to explain some of the actual accountability changes, simply because the reorganization 
of Norwegian welfare arrangements implies substantial structural changes, but not all. 
The cultural perspective provides insight into path-dependency trends and the 
increasing tension between professional cultures. The environmental perspective, 
including both the technical and the institutional environment, provides insight into the 
implications of the increased activities of the Storting, the media and the Office of the 
Auditor General. 
There are three main problems of accountability in modern representative 
democracies (Day and Klein 1999). First, the institutional and organizational links 
between political accountability and managerial accountability are often loose; second, 
political processes often do not generate the kind of precise, clear-cut objectives and 
criteria necessary for managerial accountability to be a neutral and value-free exercise; 
and third, the organizational structure is often such that the managers accountable to 
politicians cannot answer for the direct action and performance of the service providers. 
The picture is further complicated by the existence of professional, legal and social 
accountability, making accountability relations even more complex. 
We argue that the NAV reform does not necessarily reduce these problems. The role 
of political leaders is ambiguous under the NAV reform: elected officials have a role as 
strategists in defining the long-term goals of the public sector and assessing the results, 
but at the same time they are expected to give considerable discretion to operative 
agencies. Public services providers could eventually receive information about their 
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performance directly from customers without having to go through elected 
representatives. If elected political leaders have limited control over the public 
administration, is it then reasonable to hold them accountable for the actions of the 
public bureaucracy? And if elected officials should not be held accountable, then who 
should?  
The NAV reform thus seems to have made accountability a more ambiguous and 
complex issue. A central question is: Who should be held accountable for the conduct 
of complex public organizations where the problem of ‘many eyes’ is highly relevant? 
Moreover, are executive politicians willing or able to adopt the role of strategic 
managers envisaged for them? In the NAV reform there has been a shift in 
accountability from the political to the managerial sphere and from input and processes 
to output and outcomes. De-emphasizing input and process and emphasizing outcomes 
and output does not necessarily mean that government administrators are more or less 
accountable. The conceptual distinctions drawn by the reform with regard to the roles 
of minister and chief executive are amply clear on paper but less so in practice.  
Conclusion 
Overall, the reform of the welfare administration in Norway has led to limited formal 
changes in the majority of the five accountability types. This goes for administrative, 
legal and social accountability. The most obvious formal change was the introduction of 
the partnership model, altering political accountability relations at the interface between 
the principle of ministerial accountability and the principle of local self-government. 
The only unambiguous formal change was related to professional accountability. In 
practice, however, changes came about in nearly all the different types of accountability.  
How can this be explained? A crucial factor here is how the reform changed the roles 
of different groups of actors with respect to accountability. The political leadership, for 
example, has lost influence vis-à-vis the NAV agency – even though the formal political 
accountability system stayed the same at the central level – because it lacked the 
resources and capacity to deal with the size and complexity of the agency and its 
subordinate levels. While this is a structural explanation, the political leadership also 
became culturally passive towards the NAV agency, partly to avoid blame. At the same 
time, as the provider of the majority of services and resources in local partnership 
offices, the central level strengthened its influence vis-à-vis the local political level. 
The changes in administrative accountability strongly reflect how different actors 
have enacted their role since the reform, particularly with respect to control. The 
Storting has pressured the political executive to act on control, the Office of the Auditor 
General has put a lot of effort into controlling the NAV agency’s activities, partly urged 
by the Storting, and there has been an increasing internal focus on control in the NAV 
agency. All this adds up to a very complex system of administrative accountability and 
changes in the accountability culture, which some respondents see as having symbolic 
features. 
After the reorganization of the reform, including the establishment of regional back-
offices, role enactment was geared more to ensuring rule of law and equal treatment, 
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which changed judicial accountability in reality. This was also promoted by larger units, 
larger professional milieus and better quality case-work.  
Role enactment is also important for certain aspects of the weakening of social 
accountability. Employees’ and users’ organizations together with the media and the 
Storting focus a lot on problems with single cases, which leads to a mismatch with the 
more systemic features of the NAV agency and to some extent with the political 
executive. 
We also see some direct influence on actual accountability relations of the formal 
changes brought about by the reform and its reorganization. We have already 
mentioned the effects of the new mandatory partnership, but the merger itself – 
entailing the merging of three professional cultures into one – has also affected 
professional accountability. 
Major administrative reforms like the NAV reform have to be assessed in relation 
both to governance representativeness and to governance capacity (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2011). The first concern is closely related to political accountability and focuses 
on measures designed to strengthen representation of citizens’ beliefs, attitudes and 
opinions in the policy-making process. This question has an external focus and concerns 
citizens’ effectiveness and user participation and influence. The second concern has a 
bearing on administrative accountability, efficiency and to what degree social 
developments are affected by government decisions and public policy programs. This 
involves steering capability and public sector institutions’ capacity to act and has a 
stronger internal focus. The question is whether governance is efficient and effective. 
Our argument is that the study of administrative reforms needs to move beyond the 
technical–functional flavor of administrative reforms with apolitical language.  
The main challenge is to find organizational forms that enhance both the 
representativeness and the capacity of governance. Often there is a trade-off between 
the two (Dahl and Tufte 1974): reforms intended to enhance one aspect tend to harm 
the other aspect (Mattei 2009). The big question is whether it is possible to design 
welfare state reforms in a way that strengthens both representativeness and capacity. 
Experience so far from the NAV reform indicates that this is a tall order (Fimreite 
2010). Following Scharpf (1999), our analysis shows that input-oriented 
representativeness and output-oriented effectiveness are both essential elements for 
democratic self-determination. Input legitimacy of electoral arrangements and output 
legitimacy of policy service delivery are both important components of sustainable 
democratic arrangements, and successful administrative reforms in representative 
democracies have to take both features into account. There has been a shift from input 
democracy towards output democracy in contemporary reforms, weakening political 
accountability and strengthening managerial and social accountability, but this 
transformation is by no means a panacea for the ills of contemporary democracy (Peters 
2011). 
The accountability picture is even more complicated. We are facing a complex and 
compound welfare administration (Olsen 2007) that is accountable to different actors. 
Instead of choosing between different accountability mechanisms we have to treat them 
as supplementary and complementary in a mixed political order that combines and 
blends different accountability mechanisms (Olsen 2007). We are facing a multiple 
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accountability regime in which the different accountability mechanisms do not 
substitute for each other (Schillemans 2008) but are redundant rather than segregated 
(Scott 2000). Calling officials to account means inviting them to explain and justify their 
actions within a context of shared beliefs and values (March and Olsen 1995), which 
implies a dialogue between officials and those to whom they are accountable.  
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